About consensual necrophilia:'The position one takes on this issue of the "rights" of the dead (assuming, of course, that the person in question is consistent and does not contradict themselves) is no different than the position one would take on the rights of the living. If one recognizes that man has the right to make decisions that affect his own property (but not the property of others, lest the person committing this violation of property rights has his own rights stripped away from him), one recognizes the right for man to form contracts; he must allow a man to form bonds based on mutually agreed upon terms. These contracts do not have to involve life at all,except for the life within the two agreeing to the contract. There is no reason to distinguish between living and nonliving things, as longas any living things involved do not have their rights violated by the actions that would directly result from the contract.
Death results in the shutdown of all mental activities within the brain, including those that are required in order to have rights. Thus, if a dead man did not specify what he wanted to do with the body after death, the choice of the course of action should be left up to someone who is capable of making the decision (not necessarily family, as once the child reaches the age at whichhe can rationally consent to contracts he is no longer property (though he may reinstate the tiesto his family if he so desires)). The man, had he not made plans, essentially consented to whatever others desired,as dead men cannot claim to have rights (in cases when a living man makes plans for what will happen after his death, the dead man still has no rights. It is only the will of the cadaver a sit was in its living state that would prevent others from doing as they please, not anything inherent to thebody itself.)
If one wished, before death, that his body should be given to a certain person for certain purposes, it would be no different than one stating that he will hand money over if he dies. This can be broken down into the following form: If he does, in fact, die, he should give the entity heis dealing with the money that was agreed upon (through means other than the corpse rising to deliver the money, obviously). If he does not die, he is not obligated to give that entity anything (unless, of course, a separate contract was signed). Since the owner of the property with which the contract would be dealing with was able to consent and did do so, that consent is unwavering. It does not dissipate as soon as he dies. The present state of things does not change what the state ofthings was in the past, when the contract was agreed upon. Just as a log is not living, a corpseis not living, but the contracts signed by the rightful owner of these objects are not affected by that fact.'

For the most part I agree, but the devil's in the details. The main issue I have is with his analogy that it's like giving money after death. Sure, if money caused disease after a few days and encouraged a dangerous and perhaps mentally unstable act, then yes, they're the same. The main problem is that, barring some special cases, there is no deadly bacterial or fungal pathogens on or inside of money. Humans are a different story, as even before death we can be host to a number of dangerous pathogens. After death, even after a short period of time, our bodies become reservoirs for any number of deadly diseases. I'm not saying don't do it, but don't do it without regulation. Make sure that anyone using the body for whatever purpose is informed of the risks and that they are mandated by law to follow certain precautions with regards to body storage, duration of ownership, and safety in usage (whatever usage that might be).